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ABSTRACT
Does corporate political giving actually affect shareholder wealth? While firms value political
participation, some lawmakers oppose corporate involvement in politics. Yet, the existing
literature has established a correlation between campaign finance and corporate outcomes
without fully documenting a causal relation. I use an innovative database of political giving to
exploit changes in state campaign finance laws as an exogenous shock to political giving.
Specifically, I use the staggered adoption of externally imposed legal limits to political giving
across U.S. states to expose how shareholder wealth responds. I find shareholder wealth declines
following legally imposed reductions in political giving. The causal effect of political giving on
shareholder wealth that I find speaks to the larger role of politics in firms and the economy. The
results suggest corporate political giving leads to greater shareholder wealth, and reforms reduce
corporate political participation, informing the debate around campaign finance reform.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Reform of the role of corporations in politics has been ongoing for a century, yet firms
continue to participate in the political process, while the impact of reform on firms is unknown
(Milyo 1999; Primo & Milyo 2006; Coates 2012). Some policymakers seek to limit corporations
in politics to alleviate conflicts arising from special interest groups. Should firms participate in
politics? Answering this requires understanding how political engagement affects firms. The
literature linking corporations to politics suggests benefits arise from firms financially supporting
policy makers, politicians guiding firm decision-making by serving on corporate boards and
government leaders awarding valuable contracts to politically active firms (Faccio 2006; Faccio
et al. 2006; Jayachandran 2006; Faccio & Parsley 2009; Goldman et al. 2009; Hill et al. 2013a).
In particular, corporate financial support of politicians is positively correlated with stock
performance, capital access and regulatory approval of acquisitions (Claessens et al. 2008;
Cooper et al. 2010; Perez-Saiz & Semenov 2014).
Since political participation is not randomly assigned but is instead a decision
endogenous to the firm, one of the largest hurdles facing the literature of corporate participation
in politics is identifying causality. Does political participation help firms succeed or, on the other
hand, do successful firms have the resources and motivation to influence the political process?
To examine the impact corporate political engagement has on shareholder wealth, I use a quasinatural experiment from externally imposed campaign finance reforms to attain causal inference
and inform the ongoing debate over reform.

1

The staggered adoption of campaign finance reforms across U.S. states from 1988 to
2010 results in time-varying state-level law changes requiring declines in campaign finance
activity for some firms.1 Since campaign financing for state politicians is overseen by the state of
the government office, I examine financing of state political campaigns by firms in states
enacting campaign finance reforms (treatment) and compare them to otherwise similar firms in
states without reforms (control). I use these events as an exogenous shock to examine the
importance of political participation for firms. I utilize a difference-in-differences (DiD)
approach analyzing the interaction of the post (relative to the pre) reform period and treatment
(relative to control) firms. Consistent with the view that political involvement benefits firms, I
observe a negative shock in shareholder wealth for treatment firms relative to control firms
around reforms to political contribution limitations (i.e., to treatment firms in response to
plausibly exogenous declines in political participation).
My empirical approach necessitates a measure of political participation, so I define
political giving as contributions made by political action committees dedicated to a firm, which
are the mechanism firms use to finance politicians’ campaigns.2 I develop an innovative database
of state political giving to identify firms forced to lower political giving and examine how
shareholder wealth responds. The National Institute for Money in State Politics provides data on
state campaign finance activity, which are critical to exploit state reforms. Campaign finance
reforms typically impose new political giving limits, which offer plausibly exogenous declines in

1

State campaign finance reforms have also been used as a quasi-natural experiment to test causal inferences in the
public choice literature on election competition (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006).
2
Political action committees are the primary mechanism for firms to participate in campaign finance, since
government regulators (e.g., Federal Election Commission) prohibit corporate treasuries from giving funds directly
to political campaigns (Epstein 1980).
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political giving. As a result, I study reforms establishing new legal limits to political giving that
was previously unrestricted.
To examine the impact of the reforms on firms and shareholders, I also require a measure
of shareholder wealth, which I proxy for with firm value (Tobin’s Q) and stock performance (12Month Buy-and-Hold Return). I focus on performance during the four years following the
reforms and compare it to the four years prior to reforms. I also analyze alternative measures
with similar results. The economic magnitude of the results suggests the effect of limiting
political giving is substantive, as shareholders of treatment firms exhibit an average decline in
wealth of at least 5% following reforms.
In additional analysis, I use a triple differences (difference-in-differences-in-differences,
DiDiD) approach to compare firms concentrating political giving in the reform state. I analyze
firms with political giving that is more concentrated and find treatment firms with concentrated
political giving (i.e., a greater proportion of political giving limited by reforms) are adversely
affected significantly more than other treatment firms are. Further, I explore channels where
political giving could affect firms and find concentrated treatment firms are approximately 4%
less likely to receive government contracts awarded by state governments following reforms,
which is not trivial given the average subsidy value in my sample is $200 million. The results
provide evidence political giving impacts shareholder wealth, in addition to offering a specific
channel through which the firm is impacted.
The DiD approach rules out many alternative hypotheses. For example, Cooper et al.
(2010) state that “our finding of a link between contributions and future returns may simply be
driven by unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated with contributions and are also the
3

main cause of increased returns.” My results show the decline in shareholder wealth relates only
to treatment firms when political giving becomes restricted following reforms and are most
pronounced for treatment firms with concentrated political giving. Therefore, general trends in
shareholder wealth over time or effects related to firm characteristics are ruled out as alternative
explanations. Further, greater declines at treatment firms with concentrated political giving
within a state help alleviate concerns over differences between reform and non-reform states.
One potential concern is the political economy where campaign finance reforms take
place. Since the reforms take place across multiple years, plausible alternative explanations must
relate to all campaign finance reforms over time. I have carefully reviewed reforms in addition to
performing Weibull hazard models where the “failure events” are the adoption of laws restricting
political giving to identify determinants. I find no evidence that events are endogenous to firms
giving politically or those located in the state enacting reforms. Further, I find no evidence that
current or prior economic and political characteristics are significant determinants of reforms as
well as the primary cause of declines in shareholder wealth, government subsidy awards or
political giving.
I perform additional robustness tests using control firms within the states where reforms
take place and find similar results. These tests mitigate concerns regarding differences in control
firms that relate to the states where firms are headquartered beyond unobservable state fixed
effects. Further, I control for unobservable characteristics related to states, industries and years
by using fixed effects. I also measure value using industry adjusted Q and observe similar
results. To summarize, the results are robust to using multiple measures of shareholder wealth
and using different control samples to control for corporate, geographic and time-specific effects.

4

Overall, this study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. To my
knowledge, it is the first analysis of corporate political activities at both state and federal levels
of government. While existing studies primarily focus on federal political giving, the inclusion of
corporate political giving to state campaigns allows me to exploit state law changes to infer
causality between political giving and shareholder wealth. I document that a greater number of
firms give to state politicians than to federal politicians. Moreover, many of the potential benefits
from government ties are likely to occur at the state more so than at the federal level. 3 Further,
this study provides evidence that one channel through which firms benefit from greater political
giving is larger government subsidy awards. In addition, this study extends the literature on
shock-based causal inference in financial economics by using campaign finance reform to show
reforms can lead to changes in wealth for affected firms compared to otherwise similar firms
(Atanasov & Black 2014).
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. Chapter two discusses the background and
academic literature regarding campaign finance reform and corporate political giving. Chapter
three describes the empirical methodology and results before chapter four concludes.

3

See e.g., the 76th Oregon Legislative Assembly’s House Bill 4200 by Joint Special Committee on Economic
Development from the one-day special session in December 2012 which provided future financial security,
suggesting state legislatures have specific interests related to corporations headquartered in the state:
http://www.ocpp.org/media/uploads/documents/2013/2012-specsess-hb4200.en.pdf.
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CHAPTER TWO
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
While corporations participate in the political process in many ways, I focus on political
giving to campaigns, since this direct access to politicians develops reputational capital for the
firm to benefit (Claessens et al. 2008; Cooper et al. 2010; Perez-Saiz & Semenov 2014; Brown
et al. 2015). The Federal Election Commission (FEC) and state governments restrict campaign
finance through extensive procedures politicians must follow, including disclosure of the source
and use of funds. To allow equal access to participants, campaign finance is highly regulated and
often includes strict limits. Importantly, corporations are prohibited from giving directly to
political campaigns from the corporate treasury (Epstein 1980). However, corporations are
allowed to support campaigns through political action committees (PACs) dedicated to the firm,
giving from funds separate from the corporate treasury.
Campaign Finance Background
Prior to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, politically active corporations
encouraged individuals to donate. However, the regulatory process led to the rise in corporate
participation by offering an alternative mechanism for individuals to allocate more capital
(Masters & Keim 1985; Conway 1986; Humphries 1991). Since firms are strictly prohibited
from allocating corporate funds to political campaigns, firms instead administer PACs to finance
political campaigns with “hard” money political giving from corporate PACs. Corporate PACs
are firm-specific pools of money dedicated to the firm, associated with the firm stakeholders and
stockholders but independent from the corporate treasury. While individual state law varies, most

6

follow the federal model.4 In fact, 11 CFR 102.5(a)(1)(ii) allows federal and state political giving
to be made from the same corporate PAC. The FEC regulates all “hard” money, which includes
all activities and funds directly financing political campaigns and committees. Alternatively, the
FEC defines “soft” money as “money raised outside the limits and prohibitions of federal
campaign finance law.” Soft money political giving includes outside expenditures indirectly
related to politicians. While other mechanisms like soft money allow firms to participate in the
political process, none allow firms direct access to politicians. Further, the literatures on
corporate lobbying and soft money campaign finance activities document that executives benefit
in the form of additional compensation and firms have agency and free cash flow problems
(Aggarwal et al. 2012; Skaife et al. 2013).
One example of alternative channels for corporations to participate in politics includes
independent spending. Independent expenditure-only committees (i.e., “Super PACs”) cannot
give to campaigns but instead seek to participate in the political process independently from
political campaigns. Importantly, firm specific Super PACs do not exist in the manner that firmspecific PACs do, allowing minimal interaction between firms and politicians through
independent spending. Instead, many firms, individuals and organizations all give to the same
Super PAC. Further, soft money giving is not campaign-specific, indicating that the spending is
not directly linked to any particular political campaigns. The FEC clearly states, “Independent

4

The most common legal structure among states follows federal precedent of separate funds, while other states
regulate corporations similar to the FEC with similar political giving restrictions. Though some states allow firms to
give to political campaigns without organizing a separately segregated fund, much of the regulatory process is
similar for firms in these states as well. See e.g. National Conference of State Legislatures’ (NCSL) State Campaign
Finance Laws: An Overview: http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/campaign-finance-anoverview.aspx.
Also, see e.g., the FEC’s Public Records Office Summary of State Campaign Finance Laws:
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/publicrecordsoffice.shtml.
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expenditures represent spending by individuals, groups, political committees, corporations or
unions expressly advocating the election or defeat of clearly identified federal campaigns. These
expenditures may not be made in concert or cooperation with, or at the request or suggestion of,
a candidate, the candidate's campaign or a political party.”

5

These restrictions limit direct

connections between firms and politicians.
Furthermore, Super PACs are not a prominent financing source of capital for the political
channels in my study for several reasons. First, while most state campaign finance activity and
laws are similar to those at the federal level, independent expenditures are highly concentrated at
the federal level, while state and local elections are financed primarily through campaign
expenditures (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). Additionally, independent expenditures are
largely funded by individuals rather than corporations (Ansolabehere et al. 2003; Briffault 2012;
Bonica 2014). In fact, Cooper et al. (2010) document that soft money political giving and
charitable giving do not influence the relation they observe between shareholder wealth and
political giving, though it suffers from endogeneity.
Further, Super PACs were expressly prohibited beginning with the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, until the 2010 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case between Citizens United and the FEC.6 Moreover, prior to 2002, independent

5

See e.g., FEC “Independent Expenditure-Only Committees” press release detailing independent expenditure-only
committees: http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/ieoc_alpha.shtml. Additionally, see e.g., the FEC’s “Super PACs
and Other Independent Expenditure Filers,” which includes detailed descriptions of independent organizations
participating in the political process: http://www.fec.gov/portal/super_pacs.shtml.
6
See McCain–Feingold Act, Pub.L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81, enacted March 27, 2002, H.R. 2356. Also, see e.g.,
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Unfortunately, my primary research design
does not benefit from this brief sub period because campaign finance reform halted while the legal process unfolded
for BCRA. However, I do perform my analysis on the period prior to 2010 with qualitatively and quantitatively
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expenditures were far more limited. In fact, during 2012, independent expenditures were more
substantive than the two decades preceding, reaching $1 billion, while independent expenditures
were only $11 million and $34 million, respectively during 1992 and 2000.7 Therefore,
independent expenditures are of little importance prior to 2010. Overall, strict restrictions
minimize alternative, unregulated channels linking corporations and politicians such that the
primary mechanism connecting corporations to political campaigns is the corporate PAC.
Corporate Political Action Committees
The sole direct mechanism the FEC allows for corporate participation in campaign
finance is the corporate PAC. Corporate PACs are separate segregated funds (SSFs). That is,
PACs are dedicated to and administered by the firm, but PAC funds are separate from corporate
resources. In particular, corporations can create and facilitate political giving to campaigns, so
long as the corporate treasury does not fund any political giving (Milyo 1999). Individuals have
the opportunity to give both directly to campaigns and to PACs, which in turn give to campaigns.
By giving to PACs, individuals are more fully participating in the process through additional
eligible channels. Corporate leadership and political advisors administer PACs and determine
where to allocate capital. PACs rely on stakeholders and stockholders for funding, namely
executives and upper-level management. Corporate treasuries may only provide administrative
fees organizing the PAC. Further, corporate PACs cannot incentivize donations but can develop
materials illustrating the goals and purpose of the PAC. For example, Microsoft sponsors the

similar results. Similarly, correlations between political giving and firm value persist from 2002 to 2010, though the
research design suffers from endogeneity.
7
See e.g., the Center for Responsive Politics “Outside Spending,” which documents the various forms of political
spending outside of PACs: https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php?type=Y.

9

Microsoft Political Action Committee (MSPAC), which has a website stating, “Corporate
participation in the public policy process is an important and essential means of enhancing
shareholder value and is fundamental to free and democratic societies.” While employees fund
corporate PACs, the political giving is still allocated based upon corporate decisions. In many
cases, corporations have committees who evaluate candidate campaign policies and allocate
capital accordingly.8
While the literature on corporations involved in politics is vast, several studies argue that
firms benefit from participating, even though endogeneity issues prevent them from establishing
causation due to reverse causality, simultaneity bias, omitted variables and other specification
errors. Similarly, the literature specifically focused on corporate political giving directly from
PACs to political campaigns shows correlations with corporate outcomes but also suffers from
endogeneity. Cooper et al. (2010) show that federal political giving is positively associated with
both changes in shareholder wealth and certain firm characteristics, including size, profitability,
market share and union membership, in addition to industry characteristics. Though they account
for the likelihood of giving politically based on firm characteristics, the results incorporate the

8

See e.g., NCSL “Political Action Committee Contribution Limits,” which states the following: “If a corporation
desired to form a PAC, pooling contributions from its employees or outside sources into a distinct bank account, the
PAC can spend money to influence elections in a way the corporation cannot by itself.”
Also, see e.g., Microsoft’s Political Engagement website, which offers an overview: “Microsoft sponsors
the Microsoft Political Action Committee (MSPAC), to enable Microsoft employees and shareholders to participate
more effectively in the U.S. political process. The committee, created in 1988, informs its members about important
issues and government decisions that can affect Microsoft business. It also provides an opportunity for members to
collectively support public policy positions that are important to Microsoft and the software industry. As a bipartisan
organization that contributes to the campaigns of federal, state, and local candidates, MSPAC typically supports
candidates who share Microsoft views on public policy, serve as congressional or legislative leaders, represent
districts or states where Microsoft has a major business presence, or serve on committees that have jurisdiction over
legislation that is important to the company.
“The MSPAC Steering Committee evaluates candidates' public policy positions on issues that are relevant
to Microsoft business or of particular interest to the computer software industry. The committee – composed of
senior managers in Legal and Corporate Affairs at Microsoft – then decides which candidates and campaigns
MSPAC will support.”
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endogenous decision to give a particular amount in addition to the effect of the political giving.
They also find that neither non-campaign-specific soft money political giving through
independent expenditure committees nor charitable giving drives these results.
Additionally, Claessens et al. (2008) study Brazilian firms and find that political giving is
associated with more access to financing. They attempt to alleviate endogeneity concerns by
showing that political giving to presidential affiliates, incumbent and winning candidates have a
greater impact. Unfortunately, the significant positive correlation between winning and losing
candidates limits inferences. Likewise, Perez-Saiz and Semenov (2014) find that banks allocate
capital to legislators who appoint regulators in advance of acquisitions, suggesting firms give to
politically powerful legislators in advance of making acquisitions or that government officials
allow firms giving politically to grow through the acquisition market. More recently, Brown et
al. (2015) observe significantly lower and less volatile effective tax rates for firms giving
politically, another example of opportunities for firms and shareholders to benefit from political
engagement. However, in each case, similar endogeneity concerns persist. Overall, research on
political giving observes positive correlations between firm benefits and political giving, similar
to other literatures linking politics to corporate outcomes (Faccio 2006; Faccio et al. 2006;
Faccio & Parsley 2009; Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni 2012; Yu & Yu 2012; Fang & Prabhat 2013;
Hill et al. 2013a; Hill et al. 2013b; Chen et al. 2014). More importantly, the literature continues
to struggle to resolve endogeneity concerns related to omitted variables and specification errors.

11

CHAPTER THREE
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
While the evidence associating positive corporate outcomes with larger political giving
demonstrates a correlation, the causality of the relation is still unknown. Though researchers
make efforts to account for endogeneity concerns, much of the evidence in the literature
incorporates the effect of political giving on shareholder wealth as well as the endogenous
factors correlated with the firm’s decision to allocate that amount of capital to politicians. Using
time-varying political giving around campaign finance reform to exploit exogenous variation in
giving reduces the possibility that omitted variables are correlated with the variables of interest.
While federal campaign finance laws governing corporate political activity have changed very
little through time with the exception of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), state
campaign finance laws exhibit substantive variation across both states and time. Thus, the
changes in state-level restrictions implemented over the past few decades allow for a quasinatural experiment on the importance of corporate involvement in the political process and, thus,
can offer insight into the effects of campaign finance (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). I
therefore exploit changes in state campaign finance reforms to identify the relation between
corporate political giving and shareholder wealth. First, I summarize the data and show the
correlation from prior literature. Then, I use a DiD approach to test whether campaign finance
reforms affect corporate political giving and measure whether shareholder wealth responds to
these externally imposed restrictions.

12

Corporate Political Giving and Firm Characteristics
To take advantage of state campaign finance reform, I employ the most comprehensive
database of hard money corporate PAC giving to political campaigns for government offices at
all levels to test the effect on shareholder wealth. To my knowledge, this study is the first to
study hard money gifts to politicians running for all government offices from firms in the
CRSP/Compustat universe using data from the National Institute on Money in State Politics and
the FEC.9 The FEC provides data for political giving to campaigns for federal offices beginning
in 1979, and the first available state political giving data are in 1975. In order to reduce effects
attributable to the cyclical nature of elections and political giving, I compute the total from data
over a full four-year election cycle such that giving to a politician elected every four years are
incorporated throughout the term length, similar to Cooper et al. (2010).10 The sample begins in
1984, when the first full cycle of data are available, and ends in 2014, when the most recent
election cycle ends. This period allows me to observe shareholder wealth for the four years
before and after each reform, which span from 1988 to 2010.
In order to exploit the adoption of these state laws and test causality, I include state
political giving data, which are essential to capture the variation in giving largely free of
econometric concerns related to reverse causality, simultaneity bias, omitted variables and other
specification errors. In order to identify firms giving to state politicians, I collect PAC data from
the National Institute on Money in State Politics, in addition to the FEC. Since firms giving

9

Perez-Saiz and Semenov (2014) focus on state political giving and limit analysis to the importance of giving by
financial institutions to state officials governing the financial services industry in advance of mergers and
acquisitions. The remaining literature focuses on federal political giving.
10
My results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar when using the same five-year period as Cooper et al.
(2010), as well as shorter and longer time periods.
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politically decide how much to allocate to campaigns and frequently give the amount allowed by
limits (and larger quantities when political giving is not restricted), restrictions on campaign
finance implement binding constraints for some firms, resulting in exogenous variation in
political giving for these firms.
I define state political giving as contributions made by firm-dedicated PACs to political
campaigns governed by state agencies, including candidates running for both state and local
offices, while federal political giving include all contributions governed by and disclosed to the
FEC. I manually identify firms with dedicated PACs from each source. I merge the political
giving data with the CRSP/Compustat universe. All of the analysis is completed at the firm-year
observation level. I perform two sets of analyses that require multiple samples. First, I replicate
the prior literature using the full CRSP/Compustat universe (full sample). The other sample
(experiment sample) is used for the quasi-natural experiment created by campaign finance
reforms and consists of treatment firms and matching control firms. I identify treatment firms as
those headquartered in states passing campaign finance reforms imposing limits below the firm’s
previous political giving. Specifically, since each reform limits giving on a per campaign basis, I
identify treatment firms using the maximum amount allocated to any campaign during the fouryear election cycle prior to reforms.
The full sample is comprised of both firms that give to political candidate campaigns and
firms that do not. Once I merge political giving data with financial and governance information,
the final sample of all firms results in 95,878 firm-year observations pertaining to 31 years of
data for 13,229 unique firms. Firms that do not give politically are separated from those that do
give, and firms giving politically are further divided into three mutually exclusive categories:

14

firms giving to only state politicians, firms giving to state and federal politicians and firms giving
to only federal politicians.11 Firms that give politically account for approximately 30% of the
sample, with more firms giving to state campaigns than federal. Firms giving to both state and
federal politicians allocate approximately 50% of total giving to state politicians. Table I presents
firm characteristics for firms by political giving. Firms giving to state and federal politicians are
the largest, followed by firms giving to only federal, only state and not at all. In addition to
giving more politically, firms giving to state and federal politicians also have more geographic
segments, higher leverage, higher governance index and larger, more independent boards.
Comparing the groups reveals the distinctions and importance of the DiD and fixed effects in
subsequent analyses.
Despite campaign finance reform, the number of firms giving politically and the
aggregate amounts given grow significantly from 1984 to 2014 in analyses results, especially for
state political giving. While almost 20% of CRSP/Compustat firms gave politically in the 1980s
(10% to federal and 10% to state politicians), nearly 30% gave politically in the 2000s (20%
state and 10% federal). While campaign finance reform may have slowed the growth in political
giving, state political giving and federal political giving have grown at average rates of 30% and
12% during the past few decades. Taken together, these patterns indicate firm decision-makers
value state political ties highly relative to those with federal politicians.12

11

The analysis is similar when groups are separated by firm-year, election cycle or the full period using the same
categories, since political giving is persistent.
12
Most legislative activity takes place at the state level. In 2012, for example, the United States Congress passed
fewer bills than any state legislature in the country, with most state legislature passing twice as many bills as
Congress. See e.g., LegiNation, Inc., which provides data for state legislature activity: https://www.billtrack50.com/.
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Table I – Summary of Political Giving
In Table I, I present summary statistics for the CRSP-Compustat universe of firms from 1984 to 2014, grouped by
political giving. Sample means for each group are presented with the number of unique firms and observation count
listed above. Political giving is studied during four year cycles in order to reduce the cyclical nature of the data,
similar to the methodology of Cooper et al. (2010). Political Giving is the sum of political giving by a given firm to
all campaigns for any office during the prior four years ending with the election. Giving Per Campaign is the ratio of
total political giving to the total number of campaigns to whom the firm gave politically during the prior four years
ending with the election. Republican is the percentage of political giving allocated to Republican campaigns during
the prior four years ending with the election. Incumbent is the percentage of political giving allocated to incumbent
candidate campaigns during the election cycle. Headquarter State is the percentage of political giving allocated to
campaigns in the firm’s headquartered state during the prior four years ending with the election. Market Value of
Equity is total level of market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year end prior to
the election cycle, using the price at the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year end. Leverage is the ratio
of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. Geographic Segments is
the count of geographic segments the firm has listed in Compustat during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle end. Regulated Industry is an indicator equal to one if a firm operates in the financial services industry
(one-digit SIC code 6) or in the utilities industry (two-digit SIC code 49) and zero otherwise. Prior 12-Month BHR
is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end.
All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Differences compare the group to the left, with the first
column comparing firms giving to state & federal campaigns to those giving to state campaigns. Significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.
State & Federal
Political Giving
671 Firms
(N=4,142)
Political Giving Characteristics
Political Giving
458,164***
Giving Per Campaign
1,594*
Republican (%)
0.62***
Incumbent (%)
0.74***
Headquarter State (%)
0.36***

Federal
Political Giving
1,635 Firms
(N=10,092)

State Political
Giving
1,887 Firms
(N=11,648)

146,214***
1,245***
0.62
0.77***
0.24***

73,859***
1,653***
0.58***
0.64***
0.55***

No Political
Giving
9,036 Firms
(N=69,996)

Financial Characteristics
Market Value of Equity
Leverage
Geographic Segments
Regulated Industries (%)
Prior 12-Month BHR
Post 12-Month BHR

20,548***
0.268*
2.17***
0.19*
0.044***
0.046*

8,985***
0.257***
1.84***
0.15***
0.056*
0.043

3,772***
0.267***
1.43***
0.22***
0.098**
0.064*

1,072***
0.210***
1.53***
0.14***
0.041***
0.034**

Governance Characteristics
Governance Index
CEO Duality
Board Size
Independent (%)

9.87***
0.69***
11.16***
0.76***

9.88*
0.65***
10.69***
0.74***

9.13***
0.61***
9.99***
0.69***

8.91**
0.54***
8.75***
0.69***
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As much of the prior literature has documented that federal political giving is correlated
with firm value, I begin the analysis by regressing Tobin’s Q on measures of political giving and
firm characteristics in Table II. Similar to Cooper et al. (2010), I also utilize the log of political
giving measures. The positive coefficients for Log (Political Giving), Log (State Giving) and Log
(Federal Giving) indicate all are positively correlated (coefficients = 0.012, 0.020 and 0.009,
respectively) with Tobin’s Q, showing state political giving shares the positive correlation
between federal political giving and firm value without controlling for endogeneity. State giving
is also correlated with firm value beyond the correlation between state and federal giving by
including both variables in column 4. Finally, column 5 shows state political giving is correlated
with firm value even among federal givers. Panel B of Table II repeats the analysis including
only firms giving politically, which shows a similar correlation. Though firm value is correlated
with political giving, this analysis does not address endogeneity. As a result, I utilize the quasinatural experiment created from externally imposed campaign finance reforms to infer causality.
Campaign Finance Reforms
While many states follow the model of federal campaign finance laws, state campaign
finance reform varies significantly from state to state between 1984 and 2014. Twenty-two states
impose twenty-six campaign finance reforms. Seventeen of these law changes limit previously
unlimited political giving, leading to plausibly exogenous declines in political giving. The
remaining law changes relax restrictions, allowing firms to choose a higher level of political
giving. Since political giving decisions become endogenous to the firm after restrictions are
relaxed, I focus on law changes imposing limits that restrict firms’ political giving. These law
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Table II – State and Federal Political Giving
Table II tabulates the multivariate analysis of shareholder wealth for firms to analyze the relation to corporate
political giving. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of
equity from the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year-end to total assets at the prior year-end following
the end of the election cycle. Log (Political Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to all campaigns during
the election cycle. Log (State Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to state campaigns during the election
cycle. Log (Federal Giving) is the log of one plus the sum of political giving to federal campaigns during the
election cycle. Log (State Giving) * Federal is the interaction of log of one plus the political giving to state
campaigns during the election cycle with an indicator variable equal to one for firms giving to federal politicians and
zero otherwise, such that the value is equal to the log of one plus state political giving for firms also giving to federal
politicians and zero otherwise. Return-on-Assets is the ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal
year end prior to the election cycle end. Log (Total Assets) is the total level of assets of the firm in millions of USD
at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle. Intangible Ratio is the level of intangible assets scaled
by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle. R&D-to-Sales is the total level
of research and development expenses scaled by the total level of sales for the firm at the most recent fiscal year end
prior to the election cycle. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to
the election cycle end. Inverse Mills Ratio is computed using a predicted model for the likelihood of giving
politically from Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010). All models include firm and year fixed effects. All
variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered
by firm. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***.

Panel A: Multivariate Analysis of State Political Giving and Firm Value
(1)
(2)
(3)
VARIABLES
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Log (Political Giving)

(4)
Tobin's Q

0.012***
(0.002)

Log (State Giving)

0.020***
(<0.001)

Log (Federal Giving)

0.009**
(0.050)

0.019***
(<0.001)
0.005
(0.337)

-0.189***
(<0.001)
-0.349***
(<0.001)
-0.093
(0.283)
-0.470***
(<0.001)
0.001***
(0.002)
2.842***
(<0.001)

-0.194***
(<0.001)
-0.348***
(<0.001)
-0.089
(0.302)
-0.476***
(<0.001)
0.001***
(0.002)
2.879***
(<0.001)

-0.185***
(<0.001)
-0.351***
(<0.001)
-0.094
(0.274)
-0.472***
(<0.001)
0.001***
(0.002)
2.827***
(<0.001)

-0.196***
(<0.001)
-0.347***
(<0.001)
-0.089
(0.304)
-0.477***
(<0.001)
0.001***
(0.002)
2.882***
(<0.001)

0.003
(0.573)
0.022***
(<0.001)
-0.193***
(<0.001)
-0.347***
(<0.001)
-0.090
(0.299)
-0.480***
(<0.001)
0.001***
(0.002)
2.872***
(<0.001)

Yes
95,878
0.493

Yes
95,878
0.493

Yes
95,878
0.493

Yes
95,878
0.493

Yes
95,878
0.493

Log (State Giving) * Federal
Log (Total Assets)
Leverage
Return-on-Assets
Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Constant

Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(5)
Tobin's Q
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Table II – State and Federal Political Giving (Continued)
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis of State Political Giving and Firm Value among Firms Giving Politically
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
VARIABLES
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Tobin's Q
Log (Political Giving)

0.007*
(0.053)

Log (State Giving)

0.017***
(<0.001)

Log (Federal Giving)

0.001
(0.842)

0.018***
(<0.001)
-0.002
(0.670)

1.122***
(<0.001)
-0.385***
(<0.001)
-0.535***
(<0.001)
0.678***
(<0.001)
-0.458***
(0.007)
0.003
(0.447)
4.962***
(<0.001)

1.132***
(<0.001)
-0.402***
(<0.001)
-0.530***
(<0.001)
0.689***
(<0.001)
-0.469***
(0.006)
0.003
(0.427)
5.088***
(<0.001)

1.129***
(<0.001)
-0.376***
(<0.001)
-0.538***
(<0.001)
0.675***
(<0.001)
-0.459***
(0.007)
0.003
(0.447)
4.934***
(<0.001)

1.134***
(<0.001)
-0.401***
(<0.001)
-0.531***
(<0.001)
0.689***
(<0.001)
-0.468***
(0.006)
0.003
(0.426)
5.087***
(<0.001)

-0.004
(0.404)
0.0180***
(<0.001)
1.137***
(<0.001)
-0.393***
(<0.001)
-0.528***
(<0.001)
0.688***
(<0.001)
-0.479***
(0.005)
0.003
(0.427)
5.048***
(<0.001)

Yes
25,882
0.083

Yes
25,882
0.086

Yes
25,882
0.083

Yes
25,882
0.086

Yes
25,882
0.085

Log (State Giving) * Federal
Inverse Mills Ratio
Log (Total Assets)
Leverage
Return-on-Assets
Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Constant

Firm and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
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changes take place between 1988 and 2010, with half of the reforms taking place by 1996,
allowing time for exogenous variation in political giving following the law changes and
subsequent changes in shareholder wealth. While laws are not randomly assigned, the impetus
for each law differs. For example, some campaign finance reforms were enacted through voter
initiatives in the 1990s (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006).13 Though unlikely that firms
giving politically are the motivating factor in reforms, I address this concern later in additional
analyses. The most commonly imposed corporate political giving limit is $5,000 from a firm to a
political campaign during a four-year cycle. Though cost of living adjustments raise political
giving, my analysis focuses on substantive law changes, imposing limits to previously
unrestricted political giving. Limits influence the amounts firms give to politicians. Firms in
states without political giving limits allocate over 100% more capital to politicians. Appendix
A.I summarizes changes to political giving limit laws by state.
Since firms allocate 55% of political giving to campaigns in the state where the firm is
headquartered and politicians in the headquarter state are most likely to impact firms, I identify
firms located in states where campaign finance reforms limit previously unrestricted political
giving. While other firms are located in those states, I find 97 firms affected by the reforms such
that they previously gave more to a single political campaign than the subsequently enacted
reform allows. As a result, the reforms lead to plausibly exogenous declines in giving for these

13

While California and Oregon also impose political giving limits in 1996, these law changes are not included in the
analysis because they are overturned by judicial actions before an election cycle passes. These reforms do not alter
my conclusions. Also, see e.g., Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo (2006), who study the effects of changes in limits to
political giving in elections and observe that winners have more competitive elections with smaller victory margins
and more candidate campaigns once political giving limits take effect. They document that lower limits favor
challengers, increasing competition.
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97 treatment firms. I match treatment firms with firms from states that do not enact campaign
finance reform such that my experiment sample includes treatment and control firms.
To identify control firms, I draw from firms in non-reform states, excluding firms in
states where political giving limits increase. I require that firms share the first digit of the
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and year, in addition to being within 25% of
Market Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State
Campaign. Of the 97 treatment firms, 86 have at least one corresponding control firm that meets
these requirements. Further, I require each firm’s match to have the necessary data to be included
in the analysis, creating a balanced sample of treatment and control firms. Then, I select the
control firm with total headquarter state political giving closest to the treatment firm to ensure
that treatment and control firms have similar political giving and are matched on a one-to-one
basis.14 Table III presents summary statistics comparing treatment and control firms. Treatment
and control firms are characteristically indistinguishable during the year prior to reforms,
including not having significantly different Market Value of Equity (p-value = 0.778), Leverage
(0.528), Return-on-Assets (0.852), Governance Index (0.487), Business Segments (0.850),
Geographic Segments (0.583), Industry Adjusted Q (0.964) and Prior 12-Month BHAR (0.203).
This comparison suggests treatment and control assignment is “as-if” randomly assigned,
facilitating an appropriate setting for a DiD testing approach.
14

These binding constraints help identify a large sample of similar control firms. In fact, 75% of control firms are
within 5% of the Market Value of Equity of the corresponding treatment firm. Further, 80% share the first two digits
of the SIC code and 65% share the first three digits. I only require that the treatment and control firm be in the
sample for one year before and after the reforms to be included in the sample, but of the four years before and after
the reforms, each pair is included for an average of 7.4 of the 8 possible years.
The results are similar when requiring firms be present for the full period, share the first three digits of the SIC code
and be within 5% of Market Value of Equity, though the sample size reduction affects the power to test significance
in some tests. I have also performed tests with larger samples including less restrictive matching constraints and
unmatched pooled analyses with similar results.
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Table III – Summary of Firm Characteristics and Political Giving
Table III presents summary statistics for firms grouped by whether the firm is a treatment firm, giving above
subsequently imposed political giving limits during the year prior to the reform in the firm’s headquarter state. The
groups provide a quasi-natural experiment. Each group includes 86 matching firms, with sample means for each
group in addition to the p-value for the test comparing the sample means. Matching firms are required to share the
first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code industry and be within 25% of Market Value of Equity,
Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign over the most recent four-year election cycle. Then, I select
the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political Giving, such that the match is one-to-one. Market Value of
Equity is total level of market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year end prior to
the election cycle, using the price at the most recent month ending prior to the fiscal year end. Leverage is the ratio
of long-term debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. Return-on-Assets is the
ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Intangible Assets
is the level of intangible assets scaled by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle. Board Size is a count of the board of directors at the firm at the most recent annual meeting prior to
the election cycle end. Insiders is the number of the board of directors employed by the firm at the most recent
annual meeting prior to the election cycle end. Governance Index is a measure of firm governance based upon
provisions the firm holds at the most recent annual meeting date prior to the election cycle end, reported by
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), with higher numbers indicating less shareholder-friendly provisions in place or
worse overall governance. Business Segments is the count of business segments the firm has listed in Compustat
during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Geographic Segments is the count of
geographic segments the firm has listed in Compustat during the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election
cycle end. Industry Adjusted Q is the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity at the
month prior to the fiscal year end to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end, less
the median for the industry as defined by the first two digits of Standard Industrial Classification Code. Prior 12Month BHAR is the cumulative return less the market return over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal
year end prior to the election cycle end. Prior 36-Month BHAR is the cumulative return less the market return over
the prior three years immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. All variable
definitions are included in Appendix A.II.

Treatment

Control

86 Firms

86 Firms

Market Value of Equity

6,994

7,919

0.778

Leverage

0.27

0.29

0.528

Return-on-Assets

0.01

0.02

0.852

Intangible Ratio

0.18

0.16

0.367

Board Size

10.00

9.42

0.204

Board Insiders

1.37

1.36

0.971

Governance Index

9.33

8.36

0.487

Business Segments

2.52

2.62

0.850

Geographic Segments

1.41

1.56

0.583

Industry Adjusted Q

0.16

0.16

0.964

Prior 12-Month BHAR

0.09

0.02

0.203

Prior 36-Month BHAR

0.13

0.10

0.825
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P-Value of Difference
86 Firm-Pairs

To discern the impact of campaign finance reform on political giving and affirm that the
constraint binds as expected, I analyze political giving before and after reforms for treatment and
control firms. My univariate analysis serves as a traditional DiD approach. Specifically, since all
reforms impose limits to political giving from each firm to each campaign, I focus on the
maximum amount a firm gives any political campaign to identify when the new legally imposed
constraint on political giving is binding.15 Table IV tabulates Maximum Political Giving Per
Headquarter State Campaign in Panel A and Total Headquarter State Political Giving in Panel
B for treatment and control firms (first difference) during the pre and post reform periods
(second difference). I average observations during the four years (full election cycle) before and
after the reforms, to alleviate potential econometric issues related to time dependence in the
outcome variable within each firm (Bertrand et al. 2004). The results document a significant
decline in Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign of approximately 65%
for treatment firms following reforms, while control firms exhibit increases in political giving,
similar to political giving trends for the broader sample period. The first and second differences
suggest treatment firms exhibit similar political giving pre-reform but significantly lower
political giving post reform. Moreover, the DiD p-value is below 1%. Similarly, Total
Headquarter State Political Giving declines approximately 25% for treatment firms, while
remaining unchanged for control firms. While the parallel changes assumption is not directly
testable, my results in Table IV offer informal confirmation that the assumption is credible,
showing treatment and control firms exhibit similarities and correlated political giving subject to

15

Political giving is highly persistent over time, so prior giving proxies for future giving in the absence of reforms.
The first-order autocorrelation coefficient is 0.938, which has an F-statistic of 5.620, rejecting the null hypothesis of
no first-order autocorrelation.

23

Table IV – Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms
Table IV summarizes political giving around campaign finance reforms for 86 treatment and control firms during
the four-year election cycle before and after campaign finance reforms. Panel A shows maximum political giving
allocated per campaign in the firm’s headquarter state, while Panel B shows total political giving in the firm’s
headquarter state. Matching firms are required to share the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code
industry and be within 25% of Market Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign
over the most recent four-year election cycle. Then, I select the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political
Giving, such that the match is one-to-one. To alleviate concerns over cyclical effects in political giving, I use fouryear election cycle political giving measures. Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign is
computed as the maximum of all political giving to each headquarter state campaign during the four-year election
cycle before and after the law change. Total Headquarter State Political Giving is computed as the sum of all
political giving to each headquarter state campaign during the four-year election cycle before and after the law
change. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are
indicated as *, ** and ***.

Panel A: Maximum Political Giving Per Headquarter State Campaign around Campaign Finance Reforms
Pre

Post

Difference

Treatment

15,477

5,427

(10,050)***

Control

14,346

15,474

1,128***

Difference

1,131

(10,047)***

(11,178)***

Panel B: Total Headquarter State Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms
Pre

Post

Difference

Treatment

47,780

35,359

(12,421)***

Control

40,680

41,020

340

Difference

7,099*

(10,047)**

(12,081)***
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similar economic and legal forces.16 The decline in political giving for treatment firms following
campaign finance reforms suggests the experimental setting is useful for understanding the
impact on firms and shareholders when law changes externally impose shifts in political giving.
Having demonstrated the importance of campaign finance reform on political giving, I study
shareholder wealth around reforms to infer causality of political giving on corporate outcomes.
Univariate Analysis of Shareholder Wealth around Campaign Finance Reforms
My first attempt at identifying causal inference largely free of econometric concerns
involves analyzing the univariate DiD between treatment and control firms between the pre and
post reform periods. In Table V, I analyze firm value, measured by Tobin’s Q, in Panel A and
stock performance, measured by 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return, in Panel B. The second
difference in both analyses is negative and significant, indicating that treatment firms decline in
value and shareholders lose wealth following reforms, relative to control firms. The economic
magnitude suggests firm value declines by over 10%, while buy-and-hold returns decrease by
16% in the post reform period relative to control firms. In both Panel A and B, the sign of the
change from the pre to post reform period is positive for control firms and negative for treatment
firms. Table V suggests that treatment firms decline in value relative to control firms, providing
evidence that declines in political giving lead to lower shareholder wealth.
As an additional test, I examine the differential impact of the reforms on treatment firms
where law changes should have a larger effect, i.e., firms with more concentrated political
giving. I implement a DiDiD framework by comparing concentrated treatment firms to

16

Since multiple staggered shocks lead to concerns regarding parallel trends, I also employ an instrumental variable
approach as robustness, which replaces the parallel trends assumption with the “only through” assumption. The
results are similar, and conclusions unchanged.

25

Table V – Shareholder Wealth around Campaign Finance Reforms
Table V summarizes firm value and stock performance around campaign finance reforms for 86 treatment and
control firms during the four-year election cycle before and after campaign finance reforms. Matching firms are
required to share the first digit of the Standard Industrial Classification code industry and be within 25% of Market
Value of Equity, Tobin’s Q and Maximum Political Giving Per Campaign over the most recent four-year election
cycle. Then, I select the firm closest in Total Headquarter State Political Giving, such that the match is one-to-one.
Panels A and B present average firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q and 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return during
the four-year election cycle before and after reforms. I present means for the four annual observations before and
after each law change, in addition to the differences between groups, pre and post law changes for each group and
the difference-in-differences. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio of total assets less book value of equity plus market
value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the
end of the election cycle, such that the average of the four years before and after the campaign finance reform are
included. 12-Month Buy-and-Hold Return is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately preceding the
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end such that the average of the four years before and after the campaign
finance reform are included. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. Significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.

Panel A: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q around Campaign Finance Reform
Pre

Post

Difference

Treatment

1.61

1.52

(0.09)

Control

1.58

1.69

0.11**

Difference

0.03

(0.17)

(0.20)*

Panel B: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return around Campaign Finance Reform
Pre

Post

Difference

Treatment

0.25

0.12

(0.13)

Control

0.13

0.16

0.03

0.12**

(0.04)

(0.16)*

Difference
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diversified treatment firms. Specifically, I measure concentration in two manners: headquarter
state concentration and campaign concentration. Since the reforms take place in the state where
the firms are headquartered, law changes should have a disproportionately greater effect on firms
allocating a larger percentage of political giving to the headquarter state. Further, since reforms
limit giving on a per campaign basis, firms concentrating political giving among a smaller
number of candidates should also exhibit larger declines in shareholder wealth following
reforms, since the political giving structure of those firms becomes constrained to a greater
degree. I measure headquarter state concentration as the ratio of the firm’s headquarter state
political giving to giving in all state campaigns, which I analyze in Panels A (firm value) and C
(stock performance). Similarly, in Panels B and D, I measure campaign concentration as the
percentage of the firm’s top campaign gift relative to all campaigns. In each case, I bifurcate the
sample on the median and compare above and below median concentration. Table VI presents
the results.
The DiDiD results are all negative with the economic magnitudes implying declines in
shareholder wealth at least as large as those observed in Table V. Panels A and B reveal that
firms with concentrated political giving in reform states exhibit relative declines compared to
firms with more diversified political giving. Both the second and third differences are negative
and statistically significant in each case. This decline suggests that firms more reliant upon the
firm’s headquarter state exhibit the strongest reaction to law changes in that state, while other
similar firms do not exhibit the same decline. Treatment firms with geographically diversified
political giving outperform concentrated treatment firms in reform states during the post reform
period. Panel C and D also shows a similar relation for firms with concentrated and diverse
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Table VI – Concentrated Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms
Table VI summarizes firm value and stock performance around campaign finance reforms for treatment and control
firms grouped by concentration. Using the concentration of treatment firm political giving, I divide the sample in
half to identify firms more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration with two measures: headquarter state and
campaign concentration. Headquarter State Concentration is the ratio of political giving to campaigns in the firm’s
headquarter state to political giving to all state campaigns. Campaign Concentration is the ratio of political giving to
the campaign where the firm gives the most to the total political giving to all campaigns. Panels A and C use
Headquarter State Concentration, while Panels B and D use Campaign Concentration. Panels A and B measure
firm value using Tobin’s Q, while Panels C and D utilize Buy-and-Hold Return. Tobin’s Q is computed as the ratio
of total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end to total
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the end of the election cycle, such that the average of the four years
before and after the campaign finance reform are included. 12-Month BHR is the cumulative return over the prior
year immediately preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end such that the average of the four years
before and after the campaign finance reform are included. All variable definitions are included in Appendix A.II. I
present means for the four annual observations before and after each law change, in addition to the differences
between groups, pre and post law changes for each group and the difference-in-differences. Significance at the 10%,
5% and 1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.
Panel A: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q by Headquarter State Concentration
Concentrated
Diversified
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Treatment
1.53
1.14
1.69
1.91
-0.16
Control
1.54
1.83
1.62
1.55
-0.08
Difference
-0.01
-0.70*
0.07
0.36
-0.08

Difference
Post
-0.77*
0.28
-1.05***

Difference
-0.61*
0.36
-0.97***

Panel B: Firm Value Measured by Tobin’s Q by Campaign Concentration
Concentrated
Diversified
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Treatment
2.06
1.54
1.16
1.51
0.90
Control
1.05
1.23
2.11
2.15
-1.06
Difference
1.01**
0.31
-0.95**
-0.65*
1.96***

Difference
Post
0.03
-0.92
0.95**

Difference
-0.87**
0.14
-1.01**

Panel C: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return by Headquarter State Concentration
Concentrated
Diversified
Difference
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Difference
Treatment
0.34
0.20
0.17
0.05
0.17
0.15
-0.02
Control
0.11
0.20
0.15
0.12
-0.04
0.08
0.12
Difference
0.23*
-0.01
0.02
-0.08
0.21*
0.07
-0.14*

Panel D: Stock Performance Measured by Buy-and-Hold Return by Campaign Concentration
Concentrated
Diversified
Difference
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Pre
Post
Treatment
0.22
0.18
0.28
0.06
-0.06
0.12
Control
0.10
0.29
0.17
0.04
-0.07
0.25
Difference
0.13
-0.11
0.12
0.03
0.01
-0.13
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Difference
0.18
0.32*
-0.14*

political giving among campaigns. These results also provide additional evidence that the
differences observed around reforms relate specifically to changes in campaign finance activity.
Having established evidence of a univariate relation between shareholder wealth and political
giving reductions around reforms, I perform a multivariate DiD and DiDiD analysis of political
giving shocks.
Multivariate Analysis of Political Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms
I implement the DiD approach in a multivariate setting to control for additional firm
characteristics and unobservable fixed effects. I regress shareholder wealth, measured by Tobin’s
Q and BHAR12, on Treatment, Post, and Treatment * Post. Post is an indicator variable equal to
one following campaign finance reform, and Treatment is an indicator variable equal to one for
firms in states enacting reforms whose maximum political gift in the election cycle prior to the
reform exceeded the reform limit. The primary variable of interest is Treatment * Post, which
identifies the group of firms previously giving more politically than the newly imposed reform
allows after the reform takes effect. Table VII presents the results. Columns 1 and 2 present
results for Tobin’s Q, while columns 3 and 4 present results for BHAR12. Column 1 shows
treatment and control firms do not have significantly different firm value overall, consistent with
the value being similar prior to reforms. Column 2 shows that firm value is significantly lower
for treatment firms following reforms (coefficient = -0.154; p-value = 0.096). Columns 3 and 4
present similar results, with the coefficient of Treatment * Post also being negative (-0.085) and
significant (0.066). The economic magnitudes suggest that shareholder wealth declines
approximately 9% for each measure. The results support firms' claims that political giving leads
to greater shareholder wealth. Shareholder wealth decreases after limiting reforms for firms that
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Table VII – Shareholder Wealth and Political Giving around Campaign Finance Reforms
Table VII analyzes shareholder wealth for treatment and control firms around campaign finance reforms. Treatment
is an indicator variable equal to one for firms allocating at least the subsequently imposed political giving limit to
any political campaign in the firm’s headquarter state during the election cycle prior to campaign finance reform and
zero otherwise. Post is an indicator variable equal to one following campaign finance reforms and zero otherwise.
Treatment * Post is an indicator variable equal to one for treatment firms after campaign finance reforms and zero
otherwise. Size is the log of the total market capitalization of the firm in millions of USD at the election cycle end.
Book-to-Market is computed as the ratio of book value of equity at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the end of
the election cycle to the market value of equity at the month prior to the fiscal year end prior to the end of the
election cycle. Market is the cumulative return on the market over the prior year immediately preceding the fiscal
year end prior to the election cycle end. Momentum is the cumulative return over the prior year immediately
preceding the fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects.
Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are included in
Appendix A.II. Robust p-values are presented in parentheses. Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5% and 10%
thresholds as ***, ** and *, respectively.

VARIABLES
Treatment

(1)
Tobin’s Q

(2)
Tobin’s Q

(3)
BHAR12

(4)
BHAR12

0.0637
(0.708)

0.0244
(0.882)
0.002
(0.976)
-0.154*
(0.096)
-0.067
(0.245)
-0.414
(0.615)
0.732**
(0.042)
0.002
(0.761)
-0.054**
(0.035)
0.064**
(0.019)

0.0486
(0.214)

0.0248
(0.563)
0.0458
(0.187)
-0.085*
(0.066)

-0.028*
(0.081)
-0.017
(0.847)
-0.0812
(0.387)
0.004
(0.911)
0.028*
(0.080)
Yes
1,272
0.021

Post
Treatment * Post
Log (Total Assets)
Return-on-Assets
Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Business Segments
Geographic Segments

-0.066
(0.247)
-0.394
(0.638)
0.756**
(0.033)
0.003
(0.711)
-0.049**
(0.048)
0.061**
(0.021)

Size

1.634***
(<0.001)

1.541***
(<0.001)

-0.027*
(0.080)
-0.018
(0.839)
-0.077
(0.412)
0.006
(0.875)
0.026*
(0.088)

Yes
1,272
0.082

Yes
1,272
0.086

Yes
1,272
0.028

Book-to-Market
Market
Momentum
Constant

State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared
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previously allocated political giving above the subsequently imposed limit (i.e., firms legally
forced to reduce political giving) but does not for otherwise similar control firms maintaining
similar political giving.
Next, I implement the DiDiD in a multivariate setting. I add two indicator variables to
measure concentration: High Headquarter Concentration and High Campaign Concentration.
The primary variables of interest are Treat * Post * High Headquarter and Treat * Post * High
Campaign, respectively. Table VIII presents the results, which document that firms giving
politically in a concentrated manner exhibit significantly lower shareholder wealth following
reforms, relative to otherwise similar control firms and non-concentrated treatment firms. The
economic magnitude of the results demonstrates that shareholders of concentrated treatment
firms exhibit the largest decline in wealth. Each model has a significant (p-values = 0.003, 0.060,
0.019, 0.028, respectively) and negative coefficient, with each model suggesting the decline
exceeds 9%.
Government Awarded Contractual Subsidies
Finally, to provide insight into a potential channel through which political giving impacts
shareholder wealth, I analyze subsidy contracts awarded to firms by state governments. One of
the primary manners in which the literature discusses firm benefits from involvement with the
political process is through preferential treatment by government decision-makers (Faccio et al.
2006; Claessens et al. 2008; Yu & Yu 2012; Chen et al. 2014). The most direct manner in which
a government transfers capital to a corporation is through large government contract awards. If
government contracts are valuable, then firms giving politically could increase shareholder
wealth by obtaining additional contracts that offer supplementary revenue and profit.
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Table VIII – Concentrated Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms
Table VIII summarizes shareholder wealth around campaign finance reforms for firms by political giving
concentration. Using the concentration of treatment firm political giving, I divide the sample in half to identify firms
more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration with two measures: headquarter state and campaign
concentration. High Headquarter Concentration is an indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of political giving to
campaigns in the firm’s headquarter state to political giving to all state campaigns is above the sample median and
zero otherwise. High Campaign Concentration is an indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of political giving to
the campaign where the firm gives the most to the total political giving to all campaigns is above the sample median
and zero otherwise. Control variables for columns 1 and 2 include Log (Total Assets), Return-on-Assets, Intangible
Ratio, R&D-to-Sales, Business Segments and Geographic Segments, while control variables included in columns 3
and 4 are Size, Book-to-Market, Market and Momentum. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects.
Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are included in
Appendix A.II. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated as *, ** and ***.
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Table VIII – Concentrated Giving and Shareholder Wealth around Reforms (Continued)
VARIABLES
Treatment
Post
Treatment * Post
High Headquarter Concentration

(1)
Tobin’s Q

(2)
Tobin’s Q

(3)
BHAR12

(4)
BHAR12

-0.645***
(<0.001)
-0.182**
(0.038)
0.899**
(0.035)
-0.090
(0.222)

0.541**
(0.017)
-0.011
(0.928)
-0.050
(0.899)

0.025
(0.795)
0.081
(0.323)
0.017
(0.887)
0.089
(0.175)

0.140*
(0.078)
0.043
(0.284)
0.139
(0.250)

High Campaign Concentration
Treat * High Headquarter
Post * High Headquarter
Treat * Post * High Headquarter

0.356
(0.298)
-0.166
(0.402)
0.353***
(0.003)
-0.682***
(0.003)

0.017
(0.633)
0.022
(0.464)
-0.0980**
(0.019)

Treat * High Campaign

-0.449
(0.284)
0.232
(0.498)
-0.747*
(0.060)
-0.068
(0.299)
-0.666
(0.450)
0.895**
(0.021)
0.001
(0.907)
-0.068**
(0.016)
0.049**
(0.049)

Post * High Campaign
Treat * Post * High Campaign
Log (Total Assets)
Return-on-Assets
Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Business Segments
Geographic Segments

-0.004
(0.885)
0.855
(0.189)
0.624*
(0.071)
1.968**
(0.0358)
-0.051*
(0.070)
0.022
(0.414)

Size

1.587***
(<0.001)

1.079***
(<0.001)

Yes
1,272
0.271

Yes
1,272
0.064

Yes
1,272
0.032

Market
Momentum

State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Pseudo R-Squared

0.027
(0.826)
-0.050
(0.626)
-0.285**
(0.028)

-0.050*
(0.064)
0.100
(0.346)
-0.217
(0.144)
-0.055
(0.115)
0.042*
(0.081)

Book-to-Market

Constant

0.056
(0.589)
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-0.035*
(0.076)
-0.056
(0.551)
-0.116
(0.246)
-0.007
(0.845)
0.033*
(0.080)
Yes
1,272
0.017

I analyze determinants of state government contract awards to study the relation to
political giving. To examine government contracts, I collect data from Good Jobs First, a
national policy resource center tracking the largest economic development subsidy packages
awarded by state and local governments.17 While less than 1% of firms in the sample receive
government subsidies, the average subsidy value in my sample is $200 million dollars, which is
likely to be the most direct mechanism for governments to affect shareholder wealth. Table IX
examines political giving to government subsidies for the full sample, while Table X implements
the DiD approach for subsidies. Though the methodology suffers from endogeneity concerns,
Table IX shows firms giving politically, especially those allocating more money to state
politicians, also receive more frequent and larger state contracts. Column 1 documents that Log
(State Giving) is positively (coefficient = 0.0003) and significantly (p-value < 0.001) related to
the probability of being awarded a government subsidy. Column 2 shows a similar result using
an indicator variable, State Political, equal to one if the firm gives to state politicians and zero
otherwise. Firms giving politically are 25% more likely to be awarded government contracts if
they give politically.18 Further, column 3 shows that firms giving more politically are also
awarded larger contracts, while column 4 shows firms giving politically are awarded 2% larger
contracts. Since these relations may suffer from endogeneity, I perform a DiD analysis with
respect to subsidies.

17

See e.g., Good Jobs First’s Subsidy Tracker: http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/megadeals/subsidy-tracker.
I compute the conditional change in the probability by dividing the relative increase in conditional probability by
the overall probability of contract awards in the sample: ((coefficient of State Political) / (Probability of Subsidy
Award)) = 0.001 / 0.004.
18
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Table IX – Political Giving and Government Subsidies
Table IX tabulates the multivariate analysis of state government subsidy awards and corporate political giving. Log
(State Giving) is the log of one plus the political giving to state campaigns during the election cycle. State Political
is indicator variable equal to one if the firm allocates capital to political giving to state campaigns during the election
cycle and zero otherwise. Log (Subsidy) is the log of one plus the value of a subsidy value from a state or local
government awarded to the firm during the following year. Subsidy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm
receives a subsidy from a state or local government the following year and zero otherwise. Return-on-Assets is the
ratio of net income to total assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end. Log (Total Assets)
is the total level of assets of the firm in millions of USD at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle.
Intangible Ratio is the level of intangible assets scaled by total assets of the firm at the most recent fiscal year end
prior to the election cycle. R&D-to-Sales is the total level of research and development expenses scaled by the total
level of sales for the firm at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the election cycle. Leverage is the ratio of longterm debt to assets at the most recent fiscal year-end prior to the election cycle end. All variable definitions are
included in Appendix A.II. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. Industry definitions utilize twodigit Standard Industrial Classification code. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the
firm level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***.

VARIABLES
Log (State Giving)

(1)
Subsidy

(2)
Subsidy

0.0003***
(<0.001)

Leverage
Return-on-Assets
Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Constant

State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared

(4)
Log (Subsidy)

0.007***
(<0.001)

State Political
Log (Total Assets)

(3)
Log (Subsidy)

0.0004***
(<0.001)
-0.0009*
(0.084)
-0.001***
(0.00102)
-0.001*
(0.055)
-126.5
(0.265)
-0.002***
(<0.001)

0.001***
(0.009)
0.001***
(<0.001)
-0.001*
(0.090)
-0.001***
(<0.001)
-0.001*
(0.056)
-141.6
(0.266)
-0.002***
(<0.001)

0.009***
(<0.001)
-0.018*
(0.070)
-0.018***
(<0.001)
-0.024*
(0.053)
-0.00001
(0.264)
-0.037***
(<0.001)

0.020***
(0.007)
0.011***
(<0.001)
-0.017*
(0.075)
-0.020***
(<0.001)
-0.024*
(0.054)
-0.00001
(0.265)
-0.045***
(<0.001)

Yes
95,878
0.286

Yes
95,878
0.259

Yes
95,878
0.287

Yes
95,878
0.277
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Table X – Political Giving and Government Subsidies around Campaign Finance Reforms
Table X tabulates the multivariate analysis of state government subsidy awards and corporate political giving around
reforms. Log (Subsidy) is the log of one plus the value of a subsidy value from a state or local government awarded
to the firm during the following year. Subsidy is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives a subsidy
from a state or local government the following year and zero otherwise. Using the concentration of treatment firm
political giving, I divide the sample in half to identify firms more vulnerable to reforms. I measure concentration
with two measures: headquarter state and campaign concentration. All models include state, industry and year fixed
effects. Industry definitions utilize two-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. All variable definitions are
included in Appendix A.II. All models include state, industry and year fixed effects. Industry definitions utilize twodigit Standard Industrial Classification code. Robust p-values are in parentheses, with standard errors clustered at the
firm level. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are indicated as *, **, and ***.
VARIABLES
Treatment
Post
Treatment * Post

(1)
Subsidy
-0.004
(0.543)
-0.001
(0.721)
-0.010
(0.323)

(2)
Log
(Subsidy)
-0.076
(0.508)
-0.023
(0.771)
-0.192
(0.317)

High Headquarter Concentration
High Campaign Concentration
Treat * High Headquarter
Post * High Headquarter

(3)
Subsidy
-0.011
(0.204)
-0.006
(0.210)
0.012
(0.386)
0.040***
(<0.001)
-0.034**
(0.010)
0.037***
(<0.001)
-0.044***
(<0.001)

(4)
Log
(Subsidy)
-0.220
(0.199)
-0.113
(0.193)
0.235
(0.375)
0.824***
(<0.001)
-0.721***
(0.006)
0.785***
(<0.001)
-0.918***
(<0.001)

Treat * Post * High Headquarter

Intangible Ratio
R&D-to-Sales
Constant

State, Industry and Year Fixed Effects
Observations
Adjusted/Pseudo R-squared

Yes
1,272
0.104

0.070**
(0.030)
0.170
(0.627)
-0.191
(0.568)
0.006
(0.624)
0.001
(0.960)
-0.506
(0.729)

0.003*
(0.064)
0.010
(0.575)
-0.005
(0.790)
0.0003
(0.635)
-0.0003
(0.824)
-0.0207
(0.778)

0.062*
(0.056)
0.200
(0.566)
-0.109
(0.744)
0.005
(0.635)
-0.009
(0.694)
-0.435
(0.765)

Yes
1,272
0.055

Yes
1,272
0.054

Yes
1,272
0.071

Yes
1,272
0.071

Yes
1,272
0.104

Treat * Post * High Campaign

Return-on-Assets

0.240
(0.215)
-0.052
(0.911)
0.832***
(0.007)
-0.973*
(0.074)
0.107*
(0.089)
0.372
(0.521)
-0.0507
(0.932)
0.193
(0.904)
-0.025
(0.519)
-0.443
(0.824)

0.003**
(0.034)
0.008
(0.634)
-0.008
(0.616)
0.0003
(0.626)
0.0002
(0.851)
-0.026
(0.729)

Post * High Campaign

Leverage

-0.035
(0.149)
-0.014
(0.188)
0.026
(0.597)

(6)
Log
(Subsidy)
-0.731
(0.126)
-0.299
(0.163)
0.529
(0.579)

0.012
(0.231)
-0.002
(0.933)
0.039**
(0.012)
-0.046*
(0.093)
0.005*
(0.099)
0.019
(0.520)
0.0001
(0.996)
0.009
(0.910)
-0.001
(0.645)
-0.022
(0.825)

Treat * High Campaign

Log (Total Assets)

(5)
Subsidy
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table X show that the coefficient of Treatment * Post is negatively
(though not statistically significantly) related to the likelihood and size of subsidy awards. In
columns 3 through 6, I implement the DiDiD approach and observe that treatment firms giving
politically in a concentrated manner observe significant declines in the likelihood and size of
subsidy awards. The coefficients on the variables of interest are negative (-0.044, -0.918, -0.046,
-0.973, respectively) and significant (p-values <0.001, <0.001, 0.093, 0.074, respectively). The
decline in likelihood and size of subsidies for concentrated treatment firms following reforms, as
well as the positive relation between political giving and subsidies, provides causal inference for
the channel through which firms benefit from participating in the political process.
Additional Analysis of Political Giving and Shareholder Wealth
To offer additional evidence on the robustness of a causal relation between political
giving and shareholder wealth, I use an alternative research design: shock based IV approach
(Bowen et al. 2014). Since exogenous shocks often provide useful instruments, I also employ an
IV approach by following a growing strand of the finance literature (Adams & Santos 2006;
Black et al. 2006; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Guner et al. 2008; Iliev 2010). Consistent with my
prior results, I relate political giving to the reform period and observe a negative relation in
untabulated results. I also analyze the relation between the predicted variation in political giving
and shareholder wealth in order to capture the exogenous change in political giving following
campaign finance reform. In this setting, law changes meet the necessary instrument validity
requirements by offering a significant effect on political giving, being largely randomly assigned
and only impacting shareholder wealth through political giving (Angrist & Pischke 2008). I
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observe a negative relation between Post and political giving, as well as a positive relation
between the fitted value of political giving and shareholder wealth.
One concern with my research approach is that reforms need to be exogenous events.
While campaign finance reforms have been used as exogenous shocks to elections in the political
science literature, a possible concern is whether reforms are exogenous to firms, especially those
giving politically. In untabulated analyses, I examine this by performing Weibull hazard models,
where the “failure events" are the adoption of a political giving limit reduction. I find that
reforms are not significantly related to information about the political economy, including the
number or size of firms in the state, income per capita and political giving by firms overall or to
either political party. I find no evidence that firms or states allocating a disproportionate share of
giving to any particular party is a significant predictor of reforms, despite the fact that reforms
are commonly associated with progressive politicians (Stratmann & Aparicio-Castillo 2006). My
results suggest firms giving politically have little discretion over reforms, indicating campaign
finance reforms are exogenous to the treatment firms of my quasi-natural experiment. Further,
reforms are difficult for firms to predict and respond to in advance, suggesting they are also
unexpected shocks. Therefore, the exogenous shocks provided by campaign finance reforms
offer the most direct basis for causal inference to date for the effect of political giving on
shareholder wealth.
To address other concerns that the states where the laws take place may differ from other
states, I perform additional untabulated analyses. While state fixed effects likely take into
account many unobservable factors, I perform additional analysis using a matched set of control
firms within the reform states. I perform analysis with only in-state control firms, as well as
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adding these control firms to my prior methodology. Further, I perform analyses where I pool all
firms to include all possible firms to control for any potential difference in groups of firms or
states. My results are similar in all cases, and the main conclusions remain unchanged. The
results are also similar when analyzing differences between treatment and control firms rather
than taking the differences from the average levels of each. I also perform analyses where I
require that the firms only give to politicians within the reform state. While the sample is limited,
the results are qualitatively similar. I also find similar results when using propensity score
matching to identify control firms. Due to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, I also
perform subsample analyses before 2010 and observe similar results. Unfortunately, between the
BCRA of 2002 and 2010 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case between
Citizens United and the FEC, no state campaign finance reforms were enacted, largely due to
states waiting on the court system to process the federal reforms. Additionally, due to the unique
nature of the state-level data, I am able to observe whether political giving was allocated to
winning campaigns. As a result, I perform analysis focused specifically on these funds and
observe similar results on the subset of firms allocating capital to politicians winning elections.
Finally, while the number of reforms removing restrictions on political giving limits is
small, I perform additional robustness tests on these law changes. In a couple of instances, states
enact campaign finance reforms limiting political giving and subsequently pass laws removing
those restrictions. In those cases, firms forced to reduce political giving exhibit positive changes
in shareholder wealth following the removal of the restrictions providing further support for
political giving increasing shareholder wealth and suggesting campaign finance reform can
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increase or decrease shareholder wealth depending on the restrictions imposed or removed by
reforms.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION

Several studies on corporate involvement in politics have associated positive shareholder
wealth effects with political influence. In fact, the return on investment suggested by some
studies implies that corporations are significantly underinvesting in political influence. However,
a causal link between corporate outcomes and participation in the political process is unclear. I
provide the most comprehensive study of corporate political giving and shareholder wealth to
date by introducing an innovative dataset, which allows me to exploit the staggered adoption of
U.S. state laws to examine the effect of corporate political giving on shareholder wealth largely
free of econometric concerns related to reverse causality, omitted variables, simultaneity bias,
heterogeneous effects or measurement and other specification errors.
The empirical evidence indicates firms giving politically benefit from greater shareholder
wealth, and one channel for increased wealth is in the form of additional government awarded
subsidy contracts. I observe shareholder wealth declines following exogenous reductions in
political giving resulting from campaign finance reforms, relative to otherwise similar but
unaffected control firms. Importantly, the results show treatment firms reduce political giving
and only firms reducing political giving exhibit negative changes to shareholder wealth. My
empirical evidence helps measure firm benefits from political ties, suggesting the economic
magnitude is noteworthy. Additionally, the results suggest corporate political givers are
benefiting from their particular giving strategy and that reforms can force firms to alter political
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participation to the detriment of shareholders. Overall, my results document shareholder benefits
from corporate engagement in politics.
My study contributes to the literature on political links by informing the campaign
finance landscape and providing the most credible basis for causal inference to date. I also
contribute to the literature developing in financial economics that employs exogenous shocks to
offer further scrutiny to econometric concerns. My findings suggest campaign finance reform
plays an important role for corporate participants. The empirical evidence also informs the
debate around campaign finance reforms, showing restrictions can negatively impact firms
headquartered within the reform state and their shareholders. Policy makers should consider
what value, if any, is created from restricting corporate participation in the political process and
whether it exceeds the value destroyed. Public policy makers should be thoughtful of the
structures of reforms, which are critical in determining which firms are most likely to be
impacted by the law changes.

42

REFERENCES

43

Adams, R.B., Santos, J.A.C., 2006. Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm
performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 41, 55-85
Aggarwal, R.K., Meschke, J.F., Wang, T.Y., 2012. Corporate Political Donations: Investment or
Agency? Business and Politics 14, 38
Angrist, J.D., Pischke, J.-S., 2008. Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion.
Princeton university press.
Ansolabehere, S., de Figueiredo, J.M., Snyder, J.M., 2003. Why is there so little money in US
politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 105-130
Atanasov, V.A., Black, B.S., 2014. Shock-based causal inference in corporate finance research.
ECGI-Finance Working Paper, 11-08
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K.M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfenzon, D., 2007. Inside the Family
Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 122, 647-691
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., Mullainathan, S., 2004. How much should we trust differences-indifferences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 249-275
Black, B.S., Jang, H., Kim, W., 2006. Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms' Market
Values? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 22, 366413
Bonica, A., 2014. Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their
Directors and Executives. Stanford University Working Paper

44

Bowen, D.E., Frésard, L., Taillard, J., 2014. What's your Identification Strategy? Technology
Adoption within Corporate Finance. Technology Adoption within Corporate Finance
(August 5, 2014). Robert H. Smith School Research Paper
Briffault, R., 2012. Super PACs. Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group 12
Brown, J.L., Drake, K., Wellman, L., 2015. The Benefits of a Relational Approach to Corporate
Political Activity: Evidence from Political Contributions to Tax Policymakers. The
Journal of the American Taxation Association 37, 69-102
Chen, H., Parsley, D., Yang, Y.-W., 2014. Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance. Journal
of Business Finance & Accounting
Christianson, P.C., Cure, C., Erickson, J.C., Roliakoff, E.E., 1996. Lobbying, PACs, and
Campaign Finance: 50 State Handbook. West Publishing Company, Eagan, MN.
Claessens, S., Feijen, E., Laeven, L., 2008. Political connections and preferential access to
finance: The role of campaign contributions. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 554-580
Coates, J.C., 2012. Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United.
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 9, 657-696
Conway, M.M., 1986. PACs and Congressional Elections in the 1980s. Interest group politics
(2nd ed.). Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly
Cooper, M.J., Gulen, H., Ovtchinnikov, A.V., 2010. Corporate Political Contributions and Stock
Returns. Journal of Finance 65, 687-724
Epstein, E.M., 1980. PAC Phenomenon: An Overview, The. Ariz. L. Rev. 22, 355

45

Faccio, M., 2006. Politically Connected Firms. The American Economic Review 96, 369-386
Faccio, M., Masulis, R.W., McConnell, J.J., 2006. Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts.
Journal of Finance 61, 2597-2635
Faccio, M., Parsley, D.C., 2009. Sudden Deaths: Taking Stock of Geographic Ties. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44, 683-718
Fang, S., Prabhat, S., 2013. Do Corporate Political Contributions Increase Equity Value?
Evidence from a Supreme Court Decision and Related Events: Evidence from a Supreme
Court Decision and Related Events. Working Paper
Goldman, E., Rocholl, J., So, J., 2009. Do Politically Connected Boards Affect Firm Value?
Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331-2360
Guner, A.B., Malmendier, U., Tatec, G., 2008. Financial expertise of directors. Journal of
Financial Economics 88, 323-354
Hill, M.D., Kelly, G.W., Lockhart, G.B., Van Ness, R.A., 2013a. Determinants and Effects of
Corporate Lobbying. Financial Management 42, 931-957
Hill, M.D., Kubick, T.R., Lockhart, B.G., Wan, H., 2013b. The effectiveness and valuation of
political tax minimization. Journal of Banking & Finance 37, 2836-2849
Humphries, C., 1991. Corporations, PACs and the Strategic Link Between Contributions and
Lobbying Activities. Political Research Quarterly 44, 353-372
Iliev, P., 2010. The Effect of SOX Section 404: Costs, Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices. The
Journal of Finance 65, 1163-1196

46

Jayachandran, S., 2006. The Jeffords Effect. Journal of Law and Economics 49, 397-425
Malbin, M.J., Gais, T.L., 1998. The Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons
from the American States. Rockefeller Institute Press, Albany, NY.
Masters, M.F., Keim, G.D., 1985. Determinants of PAC Participation Among Large
Corporations. The Journal of Politics 47, 1158-1173
Milyo, J., 1999. The political economics of campaign finance. Independent Review-Oakland 3,
537-548
Ovtchinnikov, A.V., Pantaleoni, E., 2012. Individual political contributions and firm
performance. Journal of Financial Economics 105, 367-392
Perez-Saiz, H., Semenov, A., 2014. The Effect of Campaign Contributions on State Banking
Regulation and Bank Expansion in the U.S. European Economic Association &
Econometric Society Meeting Working Paper
Primo, D.M., Milyo, J., 2006. Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the
States. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy 5, 23-39
Skaife, H., Veenman, D., Werner, T., 2013. Corporate Lobbying and CEO Pay. University of
Texas Working Paper
Stratmann, T., Aparicio-Castillo, F.J., 2006. Competition policy for elections: Do campaign
contribution limits matter? Public Choice 127, 177-206
Yu, F., Yu, X., 2012. Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 46, 1865-1891

47

APPENDIX

48

Table A.I Summary of Campaign Finance Reform
State

Political Giving Limit Law Change

Year of Laws Passed

Alabama

Always Unlimited

Alaska

Always Limited

Arizona

Always Limited

Arkansas

Becomes Unlimited

California

Becomes Limited Then Unlimited

Colorado

Becomes Unlimited

Connecticut

Always Limited

Delaware

Always Limited

Florida

Always Limited

Georgia

Becomes Limited

Hawaii

Always Limited

Idaho

Becomes Limited

1998

Illinois

Becomes Limited

2011

Indiana

Always Unlimited

Iowa

Always Unlimited

Kansas

Always Limited

Kentucky

Becomes Limited

1988

Louisiana

Becomes Limited

1988

Maine

Always Limited

Maryland

Becomes Limited

1992

Massachusetts

Becomes Limited

1994

Michigan

Always Limited

Minnesota

Always Limited

Mississippi

Always Limited

Missouri

Becomes Limited Then Unlimited

Montana

Always Limited

Nebraska

Always Limited

Nevada

Becomes Limited

New Hampshire

Becomes Unlimited Then Limited

New Jersey

Always Limited

New Mexico

Becomes Limited

2010

New York

Becomes Limited

1994

North Carolina

Always Limited

North Dakota

Always Unlimited

Ohio

Becomes Limited

1998
1996; 1998
1998

1998

1996; 2000

1992
1986; 2000

1996
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Table A.I Summary of Campaign Finance Reform (Continued)
State

Political Giving Limit Law Change

Year of Laws Passed

Oklahoma

Always Limited

Oregon

Becomes Limited Then Unlimited

Pennsylvania

Always Limited

Rhode Island

Becomes Limited

1990

South Carolina

Becomes Limited

1992

South Dakota

Always Limited

Tennessee

Becomes Limited

Texas

Always Unlimited

Utah

Always Unlimited

Vermont

Becomes Unlimited

Virginia

Always Unlimited

Washington

Becomes Limited

West Virginia

Always Limited

Wisconsin

Always Limited

Wyoming

Always Unlimited

1996; 1998

1996

2004
1994
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Table A.II Variable Definitions

Variable
Board Insiders

Board Size

Book-to-Market

Business Segments

Federal Political Giving

Federal

Geographic Segments

Governance Index

High Headquarter
Concentration

High Campaign
Concentration

Headquarter State (%)

Measurement
A count of the board of directors at the firm
employed by the firm at the most recent
annual meeting prior to the election cycle
end
A count of the board of directors at the firm
at the most recent annual meeting prior to the
election cycle end
The ratio of book value of equity at the most
recent fiscal year end prior to the election
cycle end to market value of equity at the
month prior to the fiscal year end
The count of business segments the firm has
listed in Compustat during the most recent
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle end
The sum of federal political giving made by
a given firm over the prior four year election
cycle
Binary equal to one where the firm gives
politically to federal political campaigns and
zero otherwise
The count of geographic segments the firm
has listed in Compustat during the most
recent fiscal year end prior to the election
cycle end
A measure of firm governance based upon
provisions the firm holds at the most recent
annual meeting date prior to the election
cycle end, reported by Gompers, Ishii, and
Metrick (2003), with higher numbers
indicating less shareholder-friendly
provisions in place or worse overall
governance
Binary equal to one where the firm allocates
more capital to the firm’s headquarter state
than the median treatment firm over the prior
four year election cycle and zero otherwise
Binary equal to one where the firm allocates
more capital to the campaign where the firm
gives the most than the median treatment
firm over the prior four year election cycle
and zero otherwise
The percentage of the firm’s total political
giving allocated to campaigns for
government offices in the state where the
firm is headquartered during the election
cycle
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Data Source
RiskMetrics

RiskMetrics

Compustat Annual

Compustat Annual

Federal Election Commission

Federal Election Commission

Compustat Annual

RiskMetrics

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Compustat Annual

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Compustat Annual

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Compustat Annual

Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued)
Variable
Incumbent (%)

Industry Adjusted Q

Intangible Ratio

Inverse Mills Ratio

Leverage

Log (Federal Giving)

Log (Political Giving)

Log (Subsidy)

Log (State Giving)

Log (State Giving) *
Federal

Measurement
The percentage of the firm’s total political
giving allocated to incumbent candidate
campaigns during the election cycle
The ratio of total assets less book value of
equity plus market value of equity at the
month prior to the fiscal year end to total
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior
to the election cycle end, less the median for
the industry as defined by the first two digits
of Standard Industrial Classification Code
The ratio of intangible assets to total assets at
the most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle end
The ratio of the probability density function
to the cumulative distribution function of a
distribution computed from a probit model
predicting the likelihood of a firm to give
politically using firm size, sales, number of
employees, business segments, geographic
segments, book-to-market ratio, leverage,
cash flow, industry market share, Herfindahl
sales concentration index, regulated industry
indicator, number of firms in industry with
political action committee and industry
government contracts relative to sales
The ratio of long-term debt to assets at the
most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle end
The log transformation of one plus the sum
of a firm’s political giving to campaigns for
federal office in all states over the prior four
year election cycle
The log transformation of one plus the sum
of a firm’s political giving to campaigns for
office in all states over the prior four year
election cycle
The log transformation of one plus the value
of government subsidies received by the firm
from state and local governments during the
current year
The log transformation of one plus the sum
of a firm’s state political giving to campaigns
for office in all states over the prior four year
election cycle
The sum of a firm’s state political giving to
campaigns for office in all states over the
prior four year election cycle if the firm also
gave to federal campaigns and zero otherwise
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Data Source
National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Compustat Annual
Compustat Annual

Compustat Annual

CRSP, Compustat Annual,
United States Treasury Bureau
of the Fiscal Service

Compustat Annual

National Institute on Money in
State Politics

National Institute on Money in
State Politics

Good Jobs First National Policy
Resource Center Subsidy
Tracker Database
National Institute on Money in
State Politics

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Federal Election
Commission

Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued)
Variable
Log (Total Assets)

Market
Market Capitalization

Maximum Political
Giving Per Headquarter
State Campaign
Momentum

Political Giving Per
Campaign
Post

Treatment * Post

Post 12-Month Buy-andHold Abnormal Return
Post 12-Month Buy-andHold Return
Prior 12-Month Buyand-Hold Abnormal
Return
Prior 12-Month Buyand-Hold Abnormal
Return
R&D-to-Sales

Measurement
The log of one plus the total level of assets of
the firm in millions of USD at the most
recent fiscal year end prior to the election
cycle
The cumulative return over the twelve
months prior to the election cycle end

Data Source
Compustat Annual

The total level of market capitalization of the
firm in millions of USD at the most recent
fiscal year end prior to the election cycle,
using the price at the most recent month
ending prior to the fiscal year end
The maximum of all state political giving
allocated to campaigns for office in the
firm’s headquarter state over the prior four
year election cycle
The cumulative market-adjusted return over
the twelve months prior to the election cycle
end
The ratio of total political giving to the total
number of campaigns to which the firm gave
politically during the election cycle
Time period indicator equal to one for the
periods following campaign finance reform
in headquarter state of the treatment firm and
zero otherwise

CRSP, Compustat Annual

State and time period indicator equal to one
for firms previously giving politically above
the subsequently imposed limit and
headquartered in states reducing political
giving limits for the periods following the
law change and zero otherwise
The cumulative market-adjusted return over
the twelve months following the election
cycle end
The cumulative return over the twelve
months following the election cycle end
The cumulative market-adjusted return over
the twelve months prior to the election cycle
end
The cumulative market-adjusted return over
the twelve months prior to the election cycle
end
The ratio of research and development
expenses to sales at the most recent fiscal
year end prior to the election cycle end
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CRSP

National Institute on Money in
State Politics

CRSP

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Federal Election
Commission
National Conference of State
Legislatures; Stratmann and
Aparicio-Castillo (2006);
Christianson et al. (1996);
Malbin and Gais (1998);
Campaign Finance Law
National Conference of State
Legislatures; Stratmann and
Aparicio-Castillo (2006);
Christianson et al. (1996);
Malbin and Gais (1998);
Campaign Finance Law
CRSP

CRSP
CRSP

CRSP

Compustat Annual

Table A.II Variable Definitions (Continued)
Variable
Republican (%)

Return-on-Assets

Size

State Giving

State Political

Subsidy
Tobin’s Q

Total Headquarter State
Political Giving

Treatment

Measurement
The ratio of political giving to republican
campaigns to total political giving over the
prior four year election cycle
The ratio of net income to total assets at the
most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle end
The log of one plus the total level of market
capitalization of the firm in millions of USD
at the most recent fiscal year end prior to the
election cycle, using the price at the most
recent month ending prior to the fiscal year
end
The sum of a firm’s state political giving to
campaigns for office in all states over the
prior four year election cycle
Binary equal to one where the firm gives
politically to state but not federal political
campaigns and zero otherwise
Binary equal to one if the firm receives a
government subsidy from state and local
governments during the current year
The ratio of total assets less book value of
equity plus market value of equity at the
month prior to the fiscal year end to total
assets at the most recent fiscal year end prior
to the election cycle end
The firm’s total state political giving
allocated to campaigns for government
offices in the state where the firm is
headquartered during the election cycle
State indicator equal to one for firms
previously giving politically above the
subsequently imposed limit and
headquartered in states reducing political
giving limits and zero otherwise
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Data Source
National Institute on Money in
State Politics
Compustat Annual

CRSP, Compustat Annual

National Institute on Money in
State Politics
National Institute on Money in
State Politics
Good Jobs First National Policy
Resource Center Subsidy
Tracker Database
Compustat Annual

National Institute on Money in
State Politics, Compustat Annual

National Conference of State
Legislatures; Stratmann and
Aparicio-Castillo (2006);
Christianson et al. (1996);
Malbin and Gais (1998);
Campaign Finance Law
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